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ABSTRACT 
I Want You: Pronouns and the Military. (May 2014) 
 
Neddie Ann French 
Department of English 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Marian Eide 
Department of English 
 
This project involves analyzing the various ways in which the second-person pronoun “you” 
changes aspects of witnessing when discussing war. The goal is to examine various uses of the 
pronoun “you,” dissecting both the author’s intentions in using this particular pronoun and the 
effect it has on the reader in regards to their position outside or inside the story being told. This 
has been done by applying theories of pronoun use, witnessing, and recognition to a sample of 
war memoirs, war novels, war reports, and interviews with war veterans. Through an in-depth 
examination of the specific functions of various instances of the pronoun “you,” this research 
seeks to propose a theory for how the second-person pronoun may be used to facilitate or hinder 
the act of witnessing. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The art of story-telling predates the existence of written narratives, and many of the ancient epics 
we now deem classics, such as Beowulf and The Odyssey, began as oral narratives. With the 
advent of written history, such stories began to take the form of stable, portable media, able to be 
recorded, transcribed, and shared over various regions of the world.  Since the beginning of 
human communication, story-telling has been our most effective way of sharing experiences—
recounting events, feelings, and sensations in such a way that another person may come to 
understand something outside his or her scope of experience.  
 
The act of story-telling traditionally involves the collaboration of two parts: the storyteller and 
the audience. While people tend to view the storyteller as the active party relating ideas and 
weaving a narrative while the audience passively listens, the art of story-telling is better 
described as an interactive process. The audience plays as dynamic and important a role as the 
storyteller. If the intent of the story is to share experiences—to cultivate an understanding or a 
connection between the person speaking and the persons listening—then the job of the audience 
is to actively step into the story, taking on an alien perspective. If the audience is unwilling or 
unable to react and respond to the story, then the entire effort has been lost. 
 
But not all storytellers ask this level of involvement of their audiences, and not all experiences 
can be passed from one person to the next like a costume to be slipped on and off at will. Some 
experiences, in fact, can never be understood by anyone but the speaker. Holocaust narratives, 
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stories of abuse, experiences of war—these things can never be truly understood by those who 
lack first-hand experience. They invite a certain amount of empathy—seek to relate experiences 
and provoke thought—but they recognize that only those who have first-hand experience of such 
things can truly own these stories. To take this concept even further, some stories are told with 
the distinct purpose of alienating the audience—of making audience members aware of how 
dissimilar they are from the speaker. 
 
And so the difficulty of the listener is to discern exactly what part he or she plays in the 
narrative—what is the speaker asking of him or her? The question is one of ownership, and 
listeners must ask themselves how far they are allowed to own the experiences of the speaker. 
How far are they expected to step out of their own identities and into that of the speaker? 
 
In a reversal, sometimes the storyteller must confront this question. To what extent does he or 
she own the story? Is it even his or hers to tell? A Holocaust survivor speaking about the horrors 
of a concentration camp owns that particular narrative of survival to an extent that a 20-year old 
historian from America ever could. 
 
All of these questions can be ethically concerning for the act of story-telling, and the way in 
which speaker and listeners define their relationship with each other, as well as with the story 
itself, can drastically change the meaning of the experience. Thus, defining these relationships—
understanding the complex dynamics between author, audience, and story—can be of great 
importance.  
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One way in which this dynamic is established is through the use of the pronoun “you.” In this 
thesis, I would like to explore the various ways in which second-person pronouns, when used in 
discussing war narratives from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, can alter and adjust the dynamic 
between narrator, audience, and narrative. In particular, I would like to discuss the effect such a 
changing dynamic has on the witnessing process. 
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CHAPTER II 
“You” Forms 
 
In 2011, Lesley Stilring and Lenore Manderson conducted a linguistic study of the pronoun you, 
in which they analyzed testimonials of mastectomy survivors in order to understand the ways in 
which second-person perspective appears in the narration of traumatic experiences. They noted 
that, most often, interviewees used the pronoun you at particularly emotional moments in their 
interviews, with some of the most important and personal revelations concerning their 
experiences with breast cancer revealed through a second-person perspective (Stirling). While 
this particular positioning choice seems counterintuitive—highly personal experiences might 
reasonably be expected to occur in conjunction with the “I” of first person narration—second-
person narration actually proves a common phenomenon throughout the literature of testimony. 
This use of second-person narration to describe personal experiences has complex and interesting 
implications for the listeners and the extent to which they are asked to inhabit the narrative. To 
begin my examination of the pronoun “you” in conjunction with the war narrative, I would like 
to conduct an analysis similar to that of Stirling and Manderson, in which I dissect the various 
uses and effects of second-person pronouns in interviews with war veterans. 
 
Stirling and Manderson note that, during their mastectomy interviews, three specific types of you 
repeatedly occurred. These three types are defined by Patricia O’Connor as the self-indexing 
you, the generic you, and the involving you. All three of these ‘you’ forms can also be explored 
and explained through the analysis of veteran interviews (Stirling). 
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In a series of interviews with war veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, conducted by 
Colonel Michael Gibler and Dr. Marian Eide, a soldier named Marcus Puente spoke about his 
experiences trying to establish himself within the military. Recounting the experience of 
“pick[ing] up rank,” he says: 
They have the marine of the quarter…you stand before a panel and you go against people 
within the battalion and you do general knowledge, your general PFT scores and stuff 
[emphasis added]. 
Though the experience of standing before military panels and being assessed belongs to Marcus 
himself, he chooses to describe it from a second-person perspective. This use of ‘you’ is an 
example of Patricia O’Connor’s self-indexing you, which works as a way of interpolating a 
personal experience and applying it to a wider sub-group of people, embedding the speaker and 
his experiences into a broader context or class of people who share similar circumstances. When 
a speaker invokes this self-indexing ‘you,’ he or she is claiming that the experience in question is 
representative of the experiences of a particular group of people, called a membership category. 
Stirling and Manderson define membership categories as “the way in which conversational 
interactants use social classifications to describe and provide an abbreviated form of reference 
for the social actors they invoke” (Stirling). In Marcus’s case, he is claiming the membership 
category of every soldier who has ever stood before a military panel of judges hoping to pick up 
rank. When he says, “you stand before a panel,” what he is effectively saying is “every soldier 
who has ever attempted to pick up rank” stands before a panel and faces certain tasks—in short, 
he is painting his experience of picking up rank as representative of the process in general, all 
through the use of the second-person. Though this snippet of Marcus’s interview stands as the 
most straight-forward example of O’Connor’s self-indexing ‘you,’ Marcus peppered his 
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interview with another, more complicated form of self-indexing. This mode appeared in his 
frequent use of the phrase “you know.” 
 
While this stock phrase is often used almost involuntarily—as a vocal filler to take up air while a 
speaker thinks of what he or she will say next—studying the context in which it is most often 
used proves relevant to our discussion of the self-indexing ‘you’. Specifically, Marcus packed 
his speech with the interjection of “you know” in instances where he was discussing a more 
stereotypical aspect of the military. For example, when asked why he joined the military, Marcus 
answered: 
Uh, just after, you know, I was up there for 9/11 and was impacted by that greatly and, to 
be honest, I kinda felt like I was wasting my life here, I wasn’t dedicated to school, I was 
just getting by, you know, a C student. And, uh, you know one day I just felt I just 
needed…more direction in my life [emphasis added]. 
Or when asked to describe an ordinary day on patrol highway security: 
So we were a four vehicle platoon and so we would travel, you know, eight hours away 
from our camp at a time and, you know, we would sweep the highways whether it’s 
getting out and walking the highways and kicking tires or, you know, reacting to a bomb 
strike that a convoy experienced or, you know, sniper fire, you know, a typical day was 
four to five hour patrols then come back, sleep, get up again, you know [emphasis 
added]. 
Though Marcus used “you know” several other times throughout his hour-long interview, the 
above instances are the only times he stacked the phrase so clearly—interjecting it several times 
over the course of a single narrative description.  In both instances, Marcus refers to images or 
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ideas that can be thought of as fairly stereotypical of the military—he is recounting personal 
stories that the audience (in this case Dr. Eide and Colonel Gibler) might reasonably have heard 
before from other soldiers or possibly seen through the media. A soldier joining the military 
because he/she is not excelling at school and feels like his/her life is being wasted is not a rare 
occurrence, and is a reason his audience has likely heard before. Marcus’s “you know,” then, 
might literally be his way of saying to his audience “You know this. You have heard this or seen 
this before.” In this way he is claiming his experiences as so representational—so stereotypical 
of a soldier enlisting in the Army—that they might be understood as stock images the general 
population may be expected to have in their mind’s eye. Thus this use of “you know” becomes 
an interesting example of O’Connor’s self-indexing ‘you,’ projecting Marcus’s personal 
experiences onto an entire subgroup. The same analysis may apply to his description of his work 
on patrol—the images he describes, of “sweeping the highways…walking the highways and 
kicking tires,” are likely stock images that his audience may already have stored up from scenes 
of military on the news or portrayals of soldiers in the media. Once again, he may invoke the use 
of “you know” to suggest that his audience has a previous understanding of his experiences. 
Working as a self-indexing form of you it serves to place Marcus in the broader subgroup of 
soldiers with experience on Quick React Force in a Light Armored Vehicle. His personal 
experiences on patrol then reflect and define the experiences of the entire subgroup of soldiers. 
 
The second ‘you’ defined by O’Connor—the generic you—can be found in an interview Dr. Eide 
and Colonel Gibler conducted with a soldier named Phillip. In describing the difficulties of 
coming back from war and re-establishing relationships with his family, he states: 
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And then you've got your kids that, your mind says you outrank them, but there's not a 
rank structure. They're not your troops. You don't order them around. It's now *stomps 
foot* "Get out of bed, Zachary!" You know, you don’t come in and bang the trashcan at 
them and pull drill sergeant stuff on them. You can't. You're not supposed to do that. 
Stirling and Manderson state that the generic you seeks to turn a personal experience into a 
“general moral reflection” for all of humanity by universalizing an experience; it is similar to the 
use of the pronoun “one” (Stirling). In the instance from Phillip’s interview, he is turning a 
personal experience—learning how to become a father again once returning from war—into a 
more general truth about how children should be treated. Thus, “you can’t do that,” becomes 
“people in general can’t do that” to children, and the experience placed in a more broad position. 
It should be noted, however, that the generic ‘you’ may often overlap with the self-indexing 
‘you,’ and the lines separating these various second-person pronouns are often blurry or 
permeable. For instance, the above example could very easily be described as self-indexing 
‘you,’ with the membership category being claimed as “fathers returning home from war.” 
Looking at the example through the lens of the self-indexing ‘you,’ the struggles Phillip faces re-
integrating into his children’s lives becomes representative of the struggles faced by father-
soldiers in general. Either way, this use of second-person serves to project Phillip’s experiences 
onto a larger subgroup. 
 
The last form of ‘you’ defined by Patricia O’Connor, the involving you, is used to speak of 
experiences unique to the speaker and foreign to the addressee, with ‘‘the speaker us[ing] you, 
not I” to describe the experience (O’Connor). This form of ‘you’ is considered to be inclusive, 
and the goal is to draw the audience into the narrator’s perspective as much as possible, by 
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actually placing the audience into the body of narrator. To further explain the purpose of the 
involving ‘you, I would like to point to an experiment conducted at Tufts University by Tad T. 
Brunyé, Tali Ditman, et al., in which forty-eight students were asked to describe a series of 
simple events using first-person, second-person, and third-person pronouns. The experiment 
revealed that only the descriptions using second-person pronouns resulted in “embodied 
language comprehension,” displaying what Brunyé refers to as “internal performing,” or placing 
the narrative point within the subjective view of the person performing the task being described 
rather than as an outside viewer. As such, the “results suggest that to imagine oneself in 
‘someone else’s shoes’ during narrative comprehension, the reader must be directly addressed as 
the subject of the sentence”—addressed as you (Brunyé 5). In a reflection of this experiment, 
when asked to describe a typical day in his second deployment, Marcus’s response included 
several instances of involving you. 
You know you could be in a tower—you could be what they call a greeter—you were the 
first person to walk out to a vehicle because they had a lot of vehicles…you’re the 
greeter, Wal-Mart greeter and, basically you were there to ask everyone to get out of the 
vehicle. You would search them and their vehicle before anyone entered the check point 
[emphasis added]. 
The audience members cannot be expected to have the experience of  working at a checkpoint in 
Iraq themselves, so the use of the involving you acts as a way for Marcus to temporarily lend his 
experiences to audience members—to allow them an internal performing view of his narrative. 
Marcus’s goal, in this portion of the interview, is to make his audience understand the reality of 
his deployment—the concrete actions and motions associated with his time in the military. 
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Another example of this involving you occurs when Marcus answers the question, “When you 
mention that you have been deployed in Iraq…how to people respond?” 
You know that they may look at you differently and not treat you like a person or they 
may look down on you, may try and glorify you [emphasis added]. 
Once again, this second-person usage may create a feeling of empathy between Marcus and his 
audience, allowing them an active glimpse into his reality. It may also, it should be noted, be 
considered a use of self-indexing you, placing his experience coming home and speaking to 
civilians as typical of most soldiers and representative of the broader subgroup. Once again, we 
see how the lines between O’Connor’s three ‘you’ forms may be blurred and melded. 
 
In fact, Marcus’s interview offers another interesting instance of second-person pronoun use that 
exhibits this blurring and melding—that can be opened to various angles of analysis. When 
asked to specifically describe his experiences in combat—the kinetic narrative of fighting in 
Iraq—Marcus spoke in second-person. Analyzing this choice reveals the myriad complexities 
that may be associated with analyzing the exact purpose or effect of second-person pronoun use: 
What I felt was in, you know, looking back I don’t know if it was wrong or right to feel 
this way or if it’s what they train you to feel, I felt—you felt—adrenaline, but at the same 
time you felt more excitement than fear, and you felt…I was excited yet calm…you 
didn’t know what was going to happen…you could hear better, you could see farther, 
you just felt, you know…you would say it’s part of the training, but you looked, 
obviously couldn’t see, but you looked for the bullets, you wanted to go towards the 
action…you looked for the action [emphasis added]. 
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On one hand, this repeated use of second-person in describing a personal experience may be read 
as involving you—giving the audience concrete details and lending it the ability to see through 
his eyes (“you looked, obviously you couldn’t see, but you looked for bullets”) and feel the 
physicality of combat through his body (“you felt adrenaline”). In another analysis, several 
instances of this you might be viewed as self-indexing. For instance, when Marcus wonders if the 
adrenaline felt during combat is “the way they train you to feel.” The way they train who to feel? 
Not the audience—not Dr. Eide or the civilians listening to or reading his account. This “you” 
refers to purely military—only those who have been trained for combat. This use of second-
person places Marcus within a larger subgroup. When this use of involving and self-indexing you 
overlap, analysis becomes even more interesting. If the self-indexing you allows Marcus to place 
his personal experiences as representative of the entire subgroup, while the involving you allows 
the audience to temporarily own Marcus’s point of view, then the conjunction of both together 
serves to completely break down the walls between civilian reader and military personnel. By 
allowing his audience to take on his perspective, then placing his perspective within the larger 
subgroup of the military, Marcus is effectively moving his audience members from their own 
subjectivities and placing them—through their involvement in his subjective position—into the 
military subgroup as a whole. The lines between civilian and military subgroups, then, are 
broken down and the audience allowed access to the military membership category through 
Marcus. This works as an effective way to allow an audience more complete access to a world 
and an experience completely foreign to it.  
 
The various uses of “you” that we have examined so far—those defined by Patricia O’Connor—
have predominantly built toward one purpose: connecting the reader to the narrative and the 
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narrator in new ways. Involving, self-indexing, and generalizing ‘you’ forms all work to form 
connections that either place the narrative into a broader context or deeply involve the reader in 
the story. Either way, these “you” forms actively serve to make the narrative more relatable and, 
therefore, more easily understood. However, when used in certain ways, the second-person may 
act as a distancing mechanism; it may point out the differences between the narrator and the 
reader. 
 
Another soldier interviewed by Dr. Eide and Colonel Gibler, Taylor Sessions, offers several 
examples of this distancing ‘you’. When discussing the struggles many veterans face returning 
back to civilian life, particularly concerning the stigma of PTSD, he said: 
“It's--it's hard to fight that stereotype when that's all you hear about. You don't hear about 
the guys who deal with it on a daily basis, and we don't do anything.” 
 Unlike in previous instances, in which the second person pronoun “you” was manipulated to 
refer to the speaker himself, humanity in general, or a particular subculture, this form of “you” 
actually refers to the audience. Sessions is drawing a clear line between the audience, who only 
hears about the sensationalized, stereotypical war veteran suffering from PTSD, and the men and 
women (himself included) who suffer from PTSD every. Instead of working to draw the 
audience into his point of view, Sessions is actively distancing the audience—emphasizing the 
fundamental difference between himself (as a soldier) and the civilian population. This has the 
exact opposite effect as O’Connor’s involving “you”—rather than lending the reader a specific 
experience, Sessions asks him or her to become aware of the chasm of experience and 
knowledge that separates them. To even further delineate these two positions, Taylor uses the 
pronoun “we” to describe himself and his fellow soldiers. As a plural, first-person noun, this 
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“we” only includes men and women of the military, and very clearly excludes Dr. Eide (as a 
civilian) and the rest of his audience without military experience. In another instance, when 
asked what he missed about life in Iraq, he responded that he missed the sense of purpose he felt 
within theater, saying “It's all that other stuff you just don't--you don't get here at home.” Here, 
Sessions is pointing out a significant difference between himself as a soldier and the (presumably 
civilian) audience: he’s describing a sense of accomplishment and a feeling of purpose that, he 
explicitly states, nobody at home in America could ever feel without going to Iraq themselves. 
Adding even more depth to this particular use of ‘you,’ one could also understand this second-
person pronoun as including Taylor, to some extent, now that he is a civilian again. Once again 
thrust into the identity of a civilian—removed from the theater of war—Taylor himself becomes 
a part of that ‘you’ lacking a sense of purpose here at home. 
 
As we have seen, sometimes the second-person may distance the audience from the narrator—
pointing out differences that exist in these foreign perspectives. However, the distancing power 
of the pronoun ‘you’ may also serve to disconnect the narrator himself from his own narrative. 
Returning to Marcus’s description of combat, we can see this specific form of distancing 
accomplished: 
What I felt was in, you know, looking back I don’t know if it was wrong or right to feel 
this way or if it’s what they train you to feel, I felt—you felt—adrenaline, but at the same 
time you felt more excitement than fear, and you felt…I was excited yet calm…you 
didn’t know what was going to happen [emphasis added]. 
At one point, he switches perspective mid-sentence: “I felt—you felt—adrenaline,” then 
later stating “I was excited yet calm…you didn’t know...”  This is a clear, deliberate change from 
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one point of view to another, a move which places some distance between Marcus and his 
narrative. Were he to continue his description in first person, stating “I could hear better, I would 
see farther” his narrative would become more closed off to the audience—merely a man 
recounting his own time in combat—rather than an invitation to empathize and borrow his 
perspective. In switching to second-person, Marcus opens up the involving ‘you’ to his audience. 
As such, this switch allows him to disown his own experiences for a moment and lend them to 
the audience, creating distance between himself and his narrative. 
 
Another instance of second-person pronoun use not discussed in Stirling and Manderson’s 
mastectomy study occurred several times over the course of Sessions’s interview, in which he 
used the second person as a way of bridging the gap between himself as a soldier, and the 
insurgents attacking him. Frequently, Taylor engaged in simulated dialogue throughout his 
narrative, in which he mimicked conversations he had with other people. Mostly, these pieces of 
auto-inclusive conversation were told from Taylor’s own perspective—allowing the audience to 
glimpse his side of the conversation with other soldiers, family members, or civilians. In one 
instance, however, Taylor’s simulated dialogue actually placed him into the body of an insurgent 
in Iraq, with the addressee of the dialogue being Taylor (or American soldiers in general). When 
describing the mentality behind the influx of attacks that occurred on the base on national 
holidays, he said (speaking from the point of view of an insurgent): “We're gonna make you feel 
bad that you're not there," with “there” being at home in America. 
 
This shows an attempt made on Taylor’s part to understand the mind of his enemy—to enter into 
another subjectivity (as he understands it)—and try to see himself from a different point of view. 
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In stepping into the mind of an insurgent (at least what he perceives to be the mind of an 
insurgent), Taylor must view himself as enemy—see himself not as subject, but as object.  In 
doing so, he does not invoke the second-person pronoun to forge a connection with the audience, 
but to shed some light on the thought processes of Iraqi insurgents as he understands them to be. 
 
In another interview from Dr. Eide and Colonel Gibler, Peter Meijer, who served in Baghdad, 
creates a similar connection with the insurgents. In describing an insurgent attack on the base, he 
states, “You wanted to hit the helicopters coming in…and if you can damage a multimillion 
dollar piece of equipment…maybe you can get an RPG.”  When asked to clarify who “you” 
represented in this situation, he replied, “the insurgents.” This is a particularly interesting 
instance of self-indexing “you”. This “you” seems to apply to the subgroup of insurgents as a 
whole, saying all insurgents “wanted to hit the helicopters” or damage U.S. military property. 
Yet Peter is not an insurgent—Peter is not painting his own personal experiences as typical of the 
insurgent subgroup, because he himself has never been an insurgent. Instead, what he is doing is 
what he describes in his interview as “flip[ping] the roles” between himself and the enemy. He is 
attempting to understand the insurgents; he is placing himself into the mind of an insurgent—as 
far as he feels he can understand the motives and movements of the insurgents—in order to think 
as an insurgent might think. From this point, he is self-indexing the experiences of the 
hypothetical insurgent within the subgroup of insurgents as a whole—projecting the mental 
space of his imagined insurgent on the group overall. 
 
As we have seen, the second-person pronoun ‘you,’ when wielded by soldiers in order to discuss 
their experiences of war, may take on a myriad of meanings and accomplish many complex 
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shifts in identity. Depending on the way in which it is used, as well as viewed by the audience, 
the pronoun ‘you’ may act as a distancing mechanism to draw attention to the inherent 
differences between narrator and audience, or may work to actively engage the audience with the 
narrative. In both ways, ‘you’ serves to manipulate the dynamic of the story-telling process—to 
define how far the narrator is asking the audience to step into his or her story. Is the audience 
being invited to take on the narrator’s identity through the involving ‘you,’ or is it being pushed 
away from the narrative with a more distancing ‘you’? Such questions resonate with ethical 
importance, and help to define the purpose of the audience in relation to the narrative itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
Self-Witnessing 
 
These important questions concerning the story-telling dynamic and the ethics of narrative 
become even more complicated when the narrator himself has a more complex relationship to the 
narrative. So far we have only discussed ownership of the narrative in relation to the audience, 
examining how far the audience is asked to own the narrative. In some cases, however, 
ownership of the narrative can be complicated for the narrator as well. While there is no question 
that soldiers who experience war first-hand may claim ownership over their experiences, how do 
we approach the question of reporters? When a journalist writes about the war in Iraq, does he or 
she have the right the claim the story—to share the story—to the same extent as a soldier? To 
examine this question of narrator ownership, I would like to focus specifically on the problem of 
the embedded reporter, who claims the most multi-faceted, and therefore intriguing, relationship 
to the narrative of war. 
 
The term “embedded journalism” was first used by popular media during the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq as a way of referring to news reporters who were attached, via government connection, to 
military units involved in armed conflict. The movement toward embedded journalism began in 
America as a governmental response to pressure from the news media, who were disappointed 
by the level of access granted them during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001 U.S invasion of 
Afghanistan. Journalists who embed in the military acquire a certain “moral capital” that comes 
along with actually experiencing the combat about which they write, giving their accounts a level 
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of first-hand authority unilateral journalists lack (Dawes 66). However, embedded journalism 
also brings about several ethical issues. 
One of the most prominent ethical questions journalists face involves the principle of objectivity. 
The Encyclopedia of American Journalism defines objectivity as “freedom from bias and taint,” 
and notes that the practice of objectivity “is indispensable to good journalism” (Vaughn). Pure 
and unadulterated objectivity, however, remains impossible in practice. Deciding what is 
newsworthy, selecting what to report, and choosing which quotations are included in a story are 
all subjective choices inherent in journalism. For embedded journalists, the matter of objectivity 
appears even more troublesome. Embeddedness, by definition, requires involvement—this 
involvement, while allowing embedded journalists to claim first-hand authority over the subject 
of war, tests the principle of objectivity. By actually embedding within the military, journalists 
become partial participants in war rather than objective observers. It is this level of participation 
that raises troubling questions for journalists: from whose position are they telling the story of 
war? Are they writing about their experiences as an outside observer with some claim to 
objectivity, or as an active participant of war with first-hand experience? Is there any way to 
blend these two perspectives in order to retain objectivity while also claiming the authority of 
participation? These questions make perspectival positioning a particularly interesting issue to 
consider when reading the works of embedded journalists, and I would like to analyze one 
specific example of embedded journalism, the book War, in order to explore the issue.  
 
In War, Sebastian Junger recounts his time in the Korengal Valley embedded among American 
soldiers. His account often switches perspective forms—moving between first-person singular, 
second-person, and first-person plural—an example of deictic confusion that mirrors the 
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complexity of his position within the unit as both observer and participant. As both a member of 
the unit, and distinctly separate from the unit, Junger utilizes different pronouns to help define 
his perspectival position within the military. Of particular effect, of course, is his use of the 
pronoun “you.” 
 
Junger’s position as an embedded reporter forces him to juggle a complex mixture of 
membership categories, as he is both a reporter and a quasi-soldier.  Neither wholly objective 
reporter nor wholly soldier, he exists in the overlapping area of a Venn-diagram of the two, so to 
speak. As such, he acts as a witness both to the experiences of the soldiers going to war, as well 
as the experiences of a reporter going to war. Analyzing his use of both the self-indexing and 
involving you gives insight into this multi-dimensional act of witnessing, highlighting his 
different claims of membership categories and the implications they hold: 
You can’t write objectively about people you’re close to, but you can’t write objectively 
about people who are shooting at you either. Pure objectivity—difficult enough while 
covering a city council meeting—isn’t remotely possible in war; bonding with the men 
around you is the least of your problems [ emphasis added] (Junger 26). 
In the above paragraph, Junger discusses a problem he faces as a reporter in the Korengal Valley 
(the issue of remaining objective in reporting), but uses the pronoun ‘you’ in order to discuss the 
issue. This use of ‘you’ works in two ways.  
 
First, it cultivates in the reader a certain empathy toward Junger—an example of O’Connor’s 
involving you, which was briefly discussed earlier in relation to the interviews conducted  by Dr. 
Eide and Colonel Gibler. Now, however, I would like to conduct a more in-depth study of 
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exactly how the involving ‘you’ works. The act of entering into another person’s perspective and 
position, accomplished by the involving ‘you,’ is a key tenant of the act of witnessing, which 
Kelly Oliver defines as the social interchange (usually through story-telling) by which 
“subjectivity and humanity” are created (Oliver 90). This creation of subjectivity will be 
discussed in greater depth in a later section, but is relevant to the current line of analysis. In order 
to witness to the experiences of another person—and thus recognize their subjectivity and 
humanity—one must be able to empathize with said person. One way of creating such empathy 
may be accomplished through the use of certain pronouns. In his study of the philosophy of 
pronouns, Charles S. Peirce states that “THOU is an IT in which there is another I” (Peirce 45). 
In other words, every use of the pronoun you forces the speaker (who inherently embodies the 
position of their own ‘I’) to recognize the existence of another subjective ‘I’ living within the 
third-person ‘IT’ being addressed.  Junger’s use of you in the above scenario acts in much the 
same way: it forces upon the reader awareness of another ‘I’ outside of his or herself. This 
particular use of you, however, travels a step beyond Peirce’s theory by taking on some of the 
aspects of O’Connor’s involving you as well. Instead of simply invoking the second-person to 
compel the reader to recognize the existence of another ‘I,’ Junger forces the reader to actually 
embody that other ‘I’—to become the ‘IT’ (which is Junger himself) and metaphorically 
discover the ‘I’ within the ‘IT’.  
 
The process by which this is accomplished is rather complicated and multi-leveled. First, we 
must recognize that Junger (who is speaking as narrator in this text) and the reader are two 
separate entities, working from two separate perspectives. As a reporter embedded in the 
military, Junger is the one who struggles with objectivity, and the section from War enumerates 
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his personal conflicts. To the reader, Junger is merely an ‘IT’—a body identified as a third-
person and “negatively defined” as being non-I; therefore, his struggles are distant and unrelated 
to the reader (Peirce 45).  In trying to evoke empathy through the involving you, Junger’s first 
task is to make the reader aware of an ‘I’ outside of his or her own existence—to make the reader 
aware of Junger’s ‘I’ and thus turn him from an ‘IT’ into a subjective ‘I’. Addressing the reader 
as you, Junger accomplishes exactly what Peirce describes—he reaches out to the reader and 
recognizes the existence of a subjective ‘I’ within the reader. Conversely, this makes the reader 
aware of the subjective ‘I’ within Junger—the subjective ‘I’ that is addressing the reader as you.  
Once these two subjective ‘I’s are established (the ‘I’ of the reader and the ‘I’ of Junger), Junger 
places the reader within his ‘I’ by invoking the second-person you. He attributes to the reader his 
personal knowledge and experiences: “you can’t write objectively about people who are shooting 
at you” (Junger 26). You, Junger is saying to the reader, are now the temporary owner of my 
experiences; You are now the temporary owner of my ‘I’. In doing so, he “implicates the 
addressee as at least a potential” experiencer of his struggles as an embedded reporter (Stirling). 
By metaphorically lending the reader his experiences, Junger opens the reader to the possibility 
that his or her ‘I’ could somehow expand to the point of embodying and personalizing 
experiences not their own.  This expanding and embodying of a personal ‘I’ is the very essence 
of recognition in witnessing.  According to Oliver, witnessing to the experiences of another and 
recognizing within the other a separate subjectivity “requires the assimilation of difference into 
something familiar” (Oliver 9). The only way to fully empathize with an unfamiliar—and 
unknowable—reality is to assimilate that reality into something familiar. The act of embodying 
experiences that are not his or her own—Junger’s experiences as a journalist—creates within the 
reader a forced familiarity with those experiences. Forcing the reader to take his perspective and 
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experience the issues to which he is privy, Junger combats the issue of solipsism—or the belief 
that only one’s own mind is sure to exist. He turns the reader into a witness of his experiences as 
a reporter in the Korengal. Placing the reader directly into Junger’s shoes—into a situation in 
which he struggles—forces the reader to take on his point of view and feel from his perspective, 
thus invoking empathy.  
 
Secondly, this use of second-person you (re-stated again below) acts as a self-indexing you, 
giving Junger claims to a certain membership category—that of embedded reporters: 
You can’t write objectively about people you’re close to, but you can’t write objectively 
about people who are shooting at you either. Pure objectivity—difficult enough while 
covering a city council meeting—isn’t remotely possible in war; bonding with the men 
around you is the least of your problems (Junger 26). 
 The use of you may refer to the membership category of embedded reporters; all embedded 
reporters struggle with objectivity, not just Junger. Though the issue of objectively describing 
any experience is universal, and therefore may signal the membership group of ‘all humans,’ 
Junger’s reference to “writing about” experiences and “covering a city council meeting” makes it 
apparent that the membership group he is invoking is, in fact, journalists. Using O’Connor’s self-
indexing you, Junger interpolates his personal experience as an embedded reporter, projecting it 
onto the larger subgroup of embedded journalists in general. He is claiming that his experiences 
are representative of the experiences of the group as a whole—that you, so long as you are a 
member of the group of embedded reporters, may experience a situation similar to his own. By 
invoking this membership category and the “knowledge entitlement that goes with it,” Junger is 
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displaying his “authority as a member of this group” and thus attributing to himself the 
credibility necessary to witness to the struggles of embedded journalists (Stirling).  
 
Junger’s use of both the involving and the self-indexing you, which we have analyzed in-depth 
above, becomes even more interesting when applied to situations specific to soldiers: 
(Why appeal to God when you can call in Apaches?) You don’t haul your cook up there 
just so that he can be in his first firefight unless you’re pretty confident it’s going to end 
well…The platoon was the faith, a greater cause that, if you focused on it entirely, made 
your fears go away. It was an anesthetic that left you aware of what was happening but 
strangely fatalistic about the outcome. As a soldier, the thing you were most scared of 
was failing your brothers when they needed you. [emphasis added] (Junger 210) 
This use of you, much like the previous use, works on more than one level. It, too, engages the 
reader in such a way as to create empathy, but this time, rather than empathizing with the 
experiences of an embedded journalist, Junger asks the reader to empathize with the soldiers. He 
removes the reader from his or her own perspective and places the reader directly into the 
position of a soldier: “the thing you were most scared of was failing your brothers” (Junger 210). 
The phrase “as a soldier,” establishes “a soldier” as the anchor reference of the pronoun “you”. 
This involving you is then utilized to raise the reader’s awareness of the existence of another 
‘I’—the ‘I’ of the soldiers. Once again, Junger invokes the second-person to help the reader 
realize that just because he or she is not a soldier does not exclude him or her from understanding 
the emotions and motives of soldiers. Thus, the reader becomes a witness to the struggles of a 
soldier—restoring “subjectivity and humanity” to a subgroup formerly only viewed as “other” 
(Oliver 90). 
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One interesting difference between this example of involving you and the previous one, 
however, must be noted. In the first example discussed from War, Junger invoked the pronoun 
you in order place the reader directly into his ‘I’ and allow the reader to understand his struggles 
as a reporter. This use of the involving you worked because the experiences that Junger was 
lending the reader were his own. Junger has ownership over his experiences as an embedded 
journalist, and therefore he has the authority to ‘lend’ his experiences and perspective to the 
reader. In the second example, however, Junger appears to invoke the involving you NOT to 
invite the reader into his perspective, but to invite the reader into the perspective of a soldier. 
 How can he do this? How can Junger invoke the involving you and place the reader into a 
perspective that is, apparently, not his own? We may easily accept that Junger has claim to the 
experiences of an embedded reporter, but does he have enough claim to the experiences of a 
soldier that he may effectively ‘lend’ these experiences to the reader? In order to accept Junger’s 
above use of the involving you, we must accept that the experiences Junger is trying to lend to 
his reader are, in fact, his to lend.  
 
This perspectival problem may be explained by Barbara Dancygier’s theory of blending and 
compression. According to Dancygier, identity is a blended construct of multiple situational 
selves—our ‘I’, as we view it, is actually an amalgamation of all the different facets of our 
person, each facet with its own ‘I’. In certain situations, one may decompress this blended 
identity in order to isolate one particular facet (Dancygier). As an embedded reporter, Junger 
may lay claim not only to his identity as a reporter, but may also profess a facet of identity that 
feels as a soldier feels and experiences war as a soldier experiences war. I would posit that in the 
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above example, Junger is decompressing his identity and isolating the ‘I’ within himself that 
feels as soldiers feel—the ‘I’ that experiences combat and knows the impact of mortar on desert 
sand. Junger can then claim authority over all the experiences of his decompressed soldier ‘I’. 
This allows him to use the involving you and place the reader into the perspective of this 
decompressed ‘I’. 
 
This theory of decompression forms an interesting connection between O’Connor’s involving 
you and the self-indexing you. By decompressing his soldier ‘I’, Junger gains enough authority 
over combat experiences to ‘lend’ them to the reader, but does this authority extend to the 
membership group of soldiers as a whole? We may accept that Junger’s soldier ‘I’ has enough 
authority over combat to invoke the use of the involving you, but does his soldier ‘I’ have 
enough authority to invoke the use of the self-indexing you? If we accept Junger’s use of you as 
an example of O’Connor’s self-indexing you, then we are accepting the idea that Junger has 
enough authority within the soldier membership category that he may accurately cast the shadow 
of his experiences upon the subgroup as a whole. But Junger is not a soldier, and decompressing 
his identity does not change this fact. Though he isolates his soldier ‘I’ to discuss combat 
experiences, we must recognize that this soldier ‘I’ is still only a facet of Junger—and therefore, 
still an outside observer with incomplete knowledge of combat. No level of isolation or 
decompression can completely divorce Junger’s soldier ‘I’ from his identity as a whole; no 
matter how closely Junger tries to align himself with the soldier subgroup, he remains an outsider 
attempting to narrate experiences he can never fully understand.  
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This pervasive “outsider-ness” is perhaps one of the most interesting issues for embedded 
reporters, and it returns us back to a question raised earlier—from whose position are they really 
telling the story of war? Throughout War, Junger appears to witness to the experiences of 
soldiers in combat. He seeks to tell their story and make their experiences understood through the 
use of his soldier ‘I’, which connects his readers to the perspective of a soldier. But his 
decompressed soldier ‘I’ can only extend to a certain point of understanding; beyond that point, 
Junger must abandon his soldier ‘I’ and admit that he is an outsider lacking a full, comprehensive 
understanding of combat. It is when he finally abandons his soldier ‘I’ that the question of 
perspective and positioning becomes blurry. Without the authority of his soldier ‘I’, Junger loses 
the right to comment on his time in the Korengal Valley as a soldier, and must confine his 
understanding of combat and war to his identity as a reporter. The lens through which he views 
his surroundings, his experiences, and his feelings then switches from ‘soldier’ to ‘reporter.’ For 
example, when describing the platoon’s ritual of “blood in, blood out” (in which soldiers beat 
each other up as a sign of endearment and brotherhood), Junger’s writing becomes almost 
anthropologic. Because “blood in, blood out” is such a selective, in-group ritual, to which even 
his soldier ‘I’ cannot enter, Junger is forced to “[take] cover behind some trees” and describe the 
scene of a platoon beating as a passive observer (Junger 23). In such an instance, Junger is no 
longer illuminating the perspective of a soldier in the Korengal, but is offering insight into the 
position of being a reporter in the Korengal Valley. His experience as a reporter, hiding behind a 
tree as soldiers engage in a rock fight, become the focus of his witnessing, rather than the 
experiences of the soldiers themselves. Just as in the first example from War in which he 
discusses his struggle with objectivity, Junger’s writing serves to illuminate the undertaking of 
war reporting, rather than the war itself. 
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Using the self-indexing and involving you forms to present the issues of soldiers in some 
situations, and embedded reporters in other situations, highlights Junger’s perspective within the 
military. As a participant-observer, certain instances allow him to witness to the war as a 
participant with first-hand knowledge of combat and an authoritative soldier ‘I’. Other instances, 
however, necessitate the switch from participant to observer.  
 
This kind of multi-level witnessing ties back into the issue of objectivity. The very act of taking 
on a participatory soldier ‘I’ ruins for Junger any pretense of objectivity. To claim the authority 
of a particular decompressed identity, one must deny all other facets of their identity until their 
existence is solely defined by the decompression. In denying his reporter ‘I’ and becoming his 
soldier ‘I’, Junger loses all sense of objectivity. By becoming the subject about which they are 
writing (in the case of war reporting, this means becoming a soldier), journalists can no longer 
view their subject through an objective, detached lens. Conversely, when reporters are forced the 
abandon their soldier ‘I’ and recognize that they are inherently non-participants in war, they lose 
authority over the soldier subgroup and must forsake the soldier membership category. 
Embedded reporting, then, becomes an identity-balancing act. On one hand, embedded 
journalists must cling to the sense of objectivity that comes with being an observer, while the 
other hand offers the credibility of a participant. Studying the uses of second-person perspective 
in war narratives can help define important points of perspectival switching. 
 
Examining the use of second-person pronouns in War offers insight into the unique way in which 
an embedded reporter may bear witness to combat. In War, as we have seen, Junger utilizes 
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second-person narration as he witnesses both to his own experiences in the Korengal as a 
reporter and those of the soldiers actually engaging in combat. I would now like to focus solely 
on the instances in which second-person pronouns are used to witness to personal experiences—
in which a narrator relates occurrences that directly affected his or her sense of identity. For 
example, the following excerpt in which Junger describes riding in the back of a Humvee as part 
of a convoy into the Korengal Valley, only moments before an IED hits: 
I concentrate on running the camera. That is the easiest way to avoid thinking about the 
fact that what you’re filming could kill you. “Alright, you stay in there,” Captain Thyng 
tells the gunner. “We’re going to pull up around that corner—“ 
And that’s as far as he gets. (Junger 139 emphasis added )  
This particular story recounts an experience of which Junger has first-hand knowledge and 
understanding, rather than simply witnessing to the experiences of others. One important aspect 
often found in such personal accounts is the conjunction of second-person pronouns and present-
tense narration in recounting an event. The above excerpt utilizes present-tense narration in order 
to place the reader, or as I would posit the narrator himself, directly into a past situation, making 
the occurrence as real and present as possible. This act of referring to a past event as though it 
were currently occurring is quite common in personal narratives. Kenneth Eastridge, a soldier 
interviewed by David Phillips for the book Lethal Warriors, for example, describes the feeling of 
returning home after fighting overseas as follows:  
You’ve got to have a gun, because you think everybody that looks at you on the street is 
out to get you…it feels like everyone is the enemy. The people that were in Iraq with you 
are the only ones you can trust” (Phillips 97).  
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Due to their personal nature, these two excerpts, unlike some of the examples from War 
discussed in the previous section in which Junger recounts experiences that are not technically 
his own, contain an added layer of witnessing. The combination of second-person pronouns and 
present-tense appears to be symptomatic of this dimension of witnessing. In this section, I would 
like to argue that the specific joining of present-tense narration and second-person point of view, 
by blurring the temporal lines between past and present, allows the narrator to attempt a certain 
kind of self-witnessing. 
 
In order to understand the act of self-witnessing to which I am referring, a comprehensive 
overview of the theory of witnessing itself is necessary. Before I begin my analysis, I would like 
to walk through some terms associated with witnessing theory and define these terms for the 
specific context of my analysis. Though I briefly touched on Kelly Oliver’s theory of witnessing 
and recognition in the previous section, I would now like to revisit some of her theories in 
greater depth. As stated previously, witnessing is defined by Oliver as the social interchange by 
which “subjectivity and humanity” are created (Oliver 90). Subjectivity, or the act of “see[ing] 
oneself as a subject,” is partially defined by the ability “to imagine oneself as self-sovereign” 
(Oliver 3). To have subjectivity, in other words, is to feel empowered—to feel a sense of 
ownership over oneself and one’s identity. In stark contrast to this idea is the notion of 
objectivity. In some ways related to the idea of journalistic objectivity, the philosophical idea of 
objectivity connotes the loss of one’s subjectivity, by which a person becomes an object lacking 
a strong sense of self and identity. 
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A more traditional understanding of subjectivity and objectivity, as Oliver notes, describes the 
loss of subjectivity as solely the symptom of “being othered, oppressed, subordinated, or 
tortured” (Oliver 7). Such terms invoke images of Holocaust survivors and hostages of war—
people who have experienced physical, mental, and emotional torture at the hands of an outside 
force. While such trauma does indeed account for much of our understanding of what it means to 
lose a sense of self, the transition from subject to object is, in its simplest terms, a result of 
“traumas directed at…identit[y] and sense of [self]” (Oliver 8). All images of torture and 
physical abuse aside, people lose their subjectivity when they feel they are no longer able to 
connect with portions of their identity—or even that they lack an identity altogether. Even events 
that may be considered positive or, at the very least, neutral, may affect a person’s subjectivity 
by skewing his/her understanding of his/herself, thereby causing a disconnect between person 
and identity.  For the purpose of my analysis, we will divorce the idea of objectivity from the 
idea of trauma as much as possible, instead viewing a loss of subjectivity as a fundamental 
change in identity that makes one unknowable to oneself. 
 
The means by which lost subjectivity is restored remains the act of witnessing; the key to 
witnessing lies in the act of dialogue. As Oliver states, “we come to recognize ourselves as 
subjects or active agents through recognition from others” (Oliver 4). The aspect of recognition I 
would like to detail for the purpose of analyzing the passages from War and Lethal Warriors is 
the idea that recognition is dialogic. “Subjectivity,” as Oliver claims, “is necessarily 
intersubjective and dialogic,” and requires a dialogue between the objectified person or peoples 
and a subjective agent, so that the subjective agent may confer recognition upon the object 
(Oliver 5). There is much discussion and debate over the exact nature of dialogic recognition, 
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and scholars from Franz Fanon to Judith Butler point out that the very act of recognition itself is 
oppressive—by seeking the recognition of a subjective authority, the othered object allows an 
outside force to “define” its identity. As Judith Butler states, “[the subject] can never produce 
itself autonomously,” but instead depends on outside definition for the creation of subjectivity 
(Butler). The oppressive condition this theory of witnessing describes is combated partially by 
the idea of self-witnessing, which will be key to my analysis of War and Lethal Warriors. The 
idea of self-witnessing allows an oppressed party to “be the agent of his own recognition” and 
take part in “active meaning making and self-creation,” thus having some say in the creation of 
his or her subjectivity (Oliver 29).  There are three basic aspects of self-witnessing necessary for 
the process to work: the objectified other, the internal witness, and the external witness. The 
internal witness is the witnessing agent within the objectified other—a “subjective” identity 
within the objectified party that allows for a level of internal witnessing to occur. When an 
external witness confers recognition upon an objectified other, this internal witness “operates as 
a negotiating voice between subject position and subjectivity,” which “enable[es] and 
empower[s] a subject position” to be created within the objectified other (Oliver 87). This 
subject position (the internal witness) can then witnesses to his/herself and confer recognition 
upon the othered, objective portion of his/her identity. In other words, the existence of an internal 
witness allows for the process of witnessing to be writ on an internal level. Though there is still 
some debate over how exactly self-witnessing works, I would like to suggest that, whether or not 
the act of self-witnessing is fully and philosophically accepted, the joining of present-tense 
narration and second-person ‘you’ that I have proposed is, at the very least, symptomatic of an 
attempt at self-witnessing and the creation of an internal witness. With this in mind, I would like 
to focus my analysis of the passages from War and Lethal Warriors not on whether or not 
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successful self-witnessing can be accomplished, but rather how a narrator may attempt to create 
an internal witness and engage in dialogic self-witnessing. 
 
 If the passages from War and Lethal Warriors do indeed exhibit an attempt at self-witnessing, as 
I have claimed, then there must be a component of dialogue somewhere in the excerpts. More 
than that, I must be able to prove that the passages also contain some form of subjective agent 
witnessing to the story of an objectified other; in the case of self-witnessing, Junger and 
Eastridge, respectively, must comprise both roles as objective other and subjective internal 
witness. The process of analyzing and breaking down the phenomenon of self-witnessing is 
rather complex, and I would like to focus specifically on the example of Junger in War to walk 
through the process.  
 
Recall Dancygier’s theory of decompression and multiple-selves: according to this mode, by 
decompressing himself into a subjective, internal witness and an objective-self, Junger may 
create within himself the two components necessary for dialogic recognition: a self to share his 
experiences and a self to act as a recognizing witness. The very act of decompressing one’s 
identity into differing multiple-selves occurs when “changes in [a] person’s understanding of 
his/her own self are too important to allow the blended image to be maintained” (Dancygier). In 
Junger’s case, his time spent in the Korengal Valley (his experience being attacked by an IED in 
particular) stands as such an identity-altering event that the Junger who existed before the 
assignment to Iraq and the Junger of the present—now narrating the events of War—
conceptualize such different formulations of self that they can no longer remain blended into one 
comprehensive identity. The decompressed Junger of the past acts as the objected other of 
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traditional witnessing, as he represents an identity no longer recognized or understood by the 
current Junger; it is the Junger of the past—the Junger of the Korengal Valley—who has suffered 
the identity trauma that caused the fracturing or decompressing of his identity. With this in mind, 
the Junger of the present—the Junger narrating the events of War—acts as the subjective internal 
witness. I would argue that Junger as narrator may claim a subjective internal witness role on 
two conditions. First if subjectivity is understood to be “the impression that [one] has agency and 
that [one] can act in the world” (Oliver 3), then the very act of narrating War and re-telling the 
story of the Korengal Valley gives narrator-Junger a sense of agency and awareness of self, 
affording him the subjective role. Secondly, if the audience of War (the readers) are viewed as 
external witnesses conferring recognition upon Junger by reading his story, then narrator Junger 
can gain the subject position and become the internal witness to a past, objectified Junger. 
Having established the two Jungers necessary for the dialogic relationship of witnessing and 
recognition, we can view Junger’s use of the second-person pronoun in a new light. When he 
writes, “I concentrate on running the camera. That is the easiest way to avoid thinking about the 
fact that what you’re filming could kill you” (Junger 139), we can now view the invocation of 
the second-person pronoun as narrator-Junger directly addressing  past-Junger. With his identity 
now decompressed into a subjective-self and an objective-self, the goal of witnessing becomes 
the re-blending of the two selves. In order to do so, narrator-Junger must come to understand and 
re-assimilate the actions and experiences of past-Junger into a single, solidified identity. To do 
so, narrator-Junger must address past-Junger and establish dialogic relations, an act which we see 
occurring through the use of second-person ‘you’.  
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With decompressed past and present-selves ready to establish dialogue through the use of the 
second-person, we must now take into consideration the effect of present-tense narration. Proper 
dialogic communication must contain a component of response-ability; when one agent 
addresses another agent, the addressee must have the capability to respond, thus becoming an 
addresser. In order to have response-ability, however, the two agents interacting must share a 
temporal and spatial environment—they must be metaphorically face-to-face. In order to 
establish such dialogic relations in War, Junger’s past-self must be able to directly communicate 
with his present-self, despite the fact that his past-self inhabits the temporal space of the 
Korengal Valley while his present-self exists in the narrative moment. The feat of bringing 
together Junger’s two selves is accomplished by adopting the use of present-tense to convey a 
sense of immediacy to past actions. Dancygier touches briefly on this kind of temporal blending, 
which allows “two original input spaces…[to] blend into one.” Setting up this “blended 
space…gives rise to an emergent structure of debate-like interaction” that allows for dialogic 
exchange to occur (Dancygier). Uri Margolin calls this particular act of addressing a past 
experience as though it were presently occurring “the historical present.” He also asserts that 
such a form of narration “stem[s] from and reflect[s] a cognitive and experiential displacement,” 
and acts as a way to help re-assimilate past experiences into one’s present understanding of 
his/her self (Margolin). 
 
Applying this idea to the example from War, Junger begins the exchange by writing about his 
past experiences in the present-tense—“I concentrate on running the camera”—a narrative 
choice that forces present-Junger (Junger’s subjective-self) to re-inhabit the mental and temporal 
space of his time in the Korengal, and thus share an environment with his past-self (Junger 139). 
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He successfully blends together the input space of himself as narrator and the input space of 
himself as past-Junger, creating a new, blended space in which he can allow his two selves to 
address each other directly. Thus, when narrator-Junger addresses past/objective-Junger using 
second-person, saying “that is the easiest way to avoid thinking about the fact that what you’re 
filming could kill you,” he is able to do so in a newly-blended temporal space that allows for a 
kind of face-to-face interaction (Junger 139).  
 
The same basic process detailed extensively above, in respect to War and Junger as narrator, may 
be applied to the example from Lethal Warriors. When Kenneth Eastridge says, “You’ve got to 
have a gun, because you think everybody that looks at you on the street is out to get you,” we can 
understand it as present, narrator Eastridge (playing the part of a subjective, internal witness) 
engaging in dialogue with the past Eastridge, or the Eastridge that is familiar with the paranoia 
and unease of returning home after deployment. As with the Junger example, the use of present 
tense blends the temporal space such that past-Kenneth and present-Kenneth may experience 
respons-able dialogue. One difference between the Lethal Warriors example and the example 
from War, however, is the question of the external witness. In War, as mentioned earlier, the 
external witness is the reader. The reader, by the act of reading Junger’s account, acknowledges 
narrator-Junger as a subjective agent that may, in turn, witness to past-Junger. In Lethal 
Warriors, however, the external witness is David Phillips. Kenneth Eastridge originally told his 
story to David Phillips, who compiled Lethal Warriors. David Phillips heard Eastridge’s story, 
conferring recognition and subjectivity onto Eastridge’s internal witness. In War, the audience 
plays an important part in the witnessing process, acting as an external witness, but in Lethal 
Warriors, the audience plays a less-active part in the creation of Eastridge’s subjectivity. This 
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difference is due to the existence of David Phillips acting as the mediator between the person 
telling the story (Eastridge) and the audience themselves. 
 
Another difference between the example from War and the example from Lethal Warriors is the 
fact that one story describes a kinetic experience while the other does not. Junger narrates the 
story of a specific physical occurrence, describing it in present-tense terms—filming the scenery 
of the Korengal in the back of a Humvee. Eastridge, on the other hand, describes a general, 
emotional experience--the feeling of paranoia.  While Junger returns to a physical moment in 
order to accomplish his act of self-witnessing, Eastridge simply returns to a mental or emotional 
state in the past. The use of the historical present, in conjunction with kinetic events, serves an 
additional purpose to the act of self-witnessing that is largely absent from non-kinetic witnessing. 
Besides simply allowing for proper, response-able dialogue to occur, the use of the historical 
present with reference to a kinetic story has implications for the Freudian process of “working 
through.” Paraphrasing an idea of Shosana Laub and Dori Felman, Oliver states that “because 
witnessing is a process of re-inventing experience, of making experience what it is, through 
witnessing the structure of the logic of repetition driving the psyche, particularly the psyche of 
victimization, is transformed” (Oliver 93). In other words, it is the specific act of re-living one’s 
experiences and working through the events of the past, through the process of witnessing, that 
truly brings about transformation and allows for the regaining of subjectivity.  The use of 
historical present narration has a unique way of allowing the narrator to “work through” a past 
situation. Uri Margolin describes one aspect of the historical present as follows: 
It further replaces any overall integrated view of [the event being narrated], its outcome, 
its place and significance in the larger chain of events with partial snapshots, so that what 
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has in fact already been accomplished and concluded at speech time is now seen as a 
situation in the making with uncertain outcome and value. (Margolin). 
The historical present takes an event with a known, secure outcome, and removes it from its 
broader context such that it once again becomes an unfolding situation with an unknowable 
outcome. Thus, when a narrator invokes the use of the historical present, he or she has to 
abandon all present knowledge of how the situation unfolds, and truly work through the past 
event without the benefit of knowing how it all concludes. Rather than simply recounting a past 
event, with the knowledge of how it ends always in mind, the narrator must return to the moment 
of uncertainty and anxiety, working through the event as though it were a present crisis. If 
bearing witnessing is a “process of re-inventing experience,” as Oliver states, then historical 
present narration allows for the most complete act of re-living and re-inventing available. In the 
example from War, Junger is trying to work through the fact that “what [he’s] filming could kill 
[him],” and how he must cope with that knowledge (Junger 139). Addressing his past self—the 
self that is in the midst of a life-or-death situation—Junger is able to open up a dialogue with the 
past of himself facing death, and re-assimilate that experience into his current understanding of 
his identity. By removing this experience from his broader understanding and reliving the 
moments leading up to the IED detonation, Junger gains a level of “working through.” 
 
In contrast to such kinetic working-through, an instance of witnessing to a more internal 
experience may be found in Anthony Swofford’s Jarhead—a memoir recounting his time in 
Saudia Arabia as a Marine. In the following example, Swofford describes the feeling of being 
turned into a hero back home while absent on deployment in the Middle East, writing: 
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You say wise, brave things that your family and friends read and they become even more proud 
of you, and girls not your girlfriend read about you, the ones you almost had, and they become 
sorry for having said no, because now you are brave and wise and your words and photo are in 
the newspaper (Swofford 13). 
 
Though Swofford describes a personal experience with second-person pronouns and present-
tense narration, the component of working-through found in kinetic instances of witnessing is 
missing. There is no specific moment or physical act that Swofford must re-live—no IED 
explosions or fire-fights to which he might mentally return and re-experience. Instead, he 
witnesses to an emotional phenomenon—to his internal reaction to being made a hero by his 
folks at home. Instead of using present-tense to return to a physical moment in the past, he uses 
present-tense to return to an emotional and mental state in the past.  
 
In order to further illuminate the ways in which second-person narration and present-tense can 
join together for the purpose of self-witnessing, I would like to examine a few excerpts from 
another war memoir. Shadow of the Sword, by Navy Cross recipient Staff Sergeant Jeremiah 
Workman, contains several striking examples of the combination of historical present and 
second-person, dialogic narration. Workman’s memoir, released in 2009, frequently switches 
temporal planes, sometimes narrating Workman’s present life in Ohio after his deployment and 
sometimes narrating his time spent in Fallujah, Iraq. It is his time in Fallujah, trapped in a house 
surrounded by Iraqi insurgents and under heavy fire, which I would like to examine as a kinetic 
instance. The fire fight, which lasted several hours in reality, is drawn out over a dozen or so 
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chapters and examined in great detail by Workman. In his examination of the event, Workman 
italicizes, internal dialogue to allow his present, narrating self to address his past, witnessed self: 
That’s it. Keep going. Another ten seconds and you’ll catch up to the rest of the squad. Breathing 
hard no, gasping really. Keep it up. Don’t slow down. Don’t give in to your body. (Workman 
144). 
 
Like the passage from War, the above excerpt from Shadow of the Sword seeks to restore 
subjectivity to a past, othered, objective version of its narrator in a specific physical instance, 
once again, using the second-person ‘you’. The Jeremiah Workman of the present, through the 
very act of narrating his story and examining his past, takes on the active role of subjective 
internal witness. Jeremiah of the past—the Jeremiah being addressed in the above excerpt—is, of 
course, the objectified other. So when Workman writes “don’t give up on your body,” he is 
blending temporal planes in order to address his past self, pleading with his past self to endure. 
In doing so, he re-asserts himself into the moment of exertion, allowing for a complete working-
through of the situation that, hopefully, allows for a re-blending or re-assimilation of his 
multiple-selves.  
 
This act of re-assimilation may be understood more clearly in the passages from Shadow of the 
Sword that also invoke first-person plural: 
Okay. No more spraying and praying. Make the shots count. Let’s get up here this time. 
(Workman 147). 
And our child. Boy or girl, I don’t care. I just want to be a good father to a healthy kid. 
(Workman 177). 
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I would like to briefly note that the first instance is a kinetic example, while the second example 
describes internal, emotional dialogue without referring to a physical situation. Both excerpts, 
which utilize first-person plural (our, let’s), either directly follow or lead into instances in which 
Workman uses italicized text as internal dialogue between past-Jeremiah and narrating-Jeremiah. 
As such, we understand the first-person plural to refer to a conjunction of the two—to the joining 
and merging of the past and the present within the narrator. When Workman refers to “our 
child,” he is blending together past-Workman and present-Workman into a first-person, plural 
position. Such a merging illustrates the entire purpose of these instances of self-witnessing: to re-
blend the decompressed identity into a single, coherent self. What was once fractured must now 
be mended. In discussing Dominik La Capra and his adaptation of Freud’s theory of transference 
as it relates to the act of working-through trauma, Oliver briefly touches in this idea of re-
assimilating decompressed multi-selves into one identity: 
transformation is based in acknowledging transference and retrieving what has been 
repressed…working-through requires interpretation born out of self-critical reflection and 
dialogue. (Oliver 81). 
 Just as “witnessing enables the subject to reconstitute the experience of objectification in ways 
that allow her to reinsert subjectivity,” the self-witnessing that we have examined utilizes the act 
of working-through to allow for subjectivity to be re-inserted into a past trauma. 
 
Many of the excerpts discussed in regards to the combination of second-person narration and 
present-tense may also be defined by Patricia O’Connor’s three “you” forms. In fact, several of 
the examples mentioned contain elements of self-indexing and involving “you.” Similarly, the 
earlier excerpt from War in which Junger discusses the issues concerning objectivity inherent in 
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working as an embedded journalist--“you can’t write objectively about people you’re close to, 
but you can’t write objectively about people who are shooting at you either”—may be viewed as 
an example of self-witnessing due to the present-tense narration (Junger 26). The two theories of 
“you”—that which Patricia O’Connor has detailed and the theory of self-witnessing I outlined—
are not mutually exclusive and overlap on several occasions. Examples in which past-tense is 
used with second-person narration, however, may only be viewed through the lens of Patricia 
O’Connor’s “you” theory. For example, the following excerpt from Lethal Warriors, in which an 
unnamed soldier described fellow Marine Anthony Marquez :  
“He would do anything you wanted him to do, but you needed to keep him on a short 
leash because he would also do what you didn’t want him to do” (Phillips 72). 
Due to the use of past-tense narration, the element of Margolin’s historical present is lacking and 
therefore the dialogic element necessary for self-witnessing is not present. The soldier is neither 
attempting to re-insert himself into a kinetic situation for the benefit of working-through, nor is 
he re-living an emotional experience or accessing a past mental state. His use of “you” most 
closely resembles O’Connor’s involving “you.” On a related note, when a person uses second-
person pronouns and present-tense to witness to an event that is not their own, then the self-
witnessing element is again absent. For example, the excerpt from War in which Junger 
describes the mental landscape of a soldier, saying “you don’t haul your cook up there just so 
that he can be in his first firefight unless you’re pretty confident it’s going to end well,” lacks a 
self-witnessing element (Junger 210). Though both present-tense address and second-person 
narration are invoked, the fact that the mental experience described is not Junger’s own, the act 
of re-inserting oneself into a past experience is unavailable to him. He cannot revisit a mental 
sphere that is fundamentally unknowable to him.  
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The act of witnessing requires many ethical considerations, and readers should think critically 
about where they are being positioned in relation to the narrative to which they are witnessing. 
Narrators, as well, must occupy a perspective appropriate to their ownership of the story. By 
examining the use of the second-person pronouns in personal narratives, the story-telling 
dynamic can be established and understood. 
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